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 A FAN TASY OF JU STICE 
J ohn O’BRIEN 
Montaigne’s essay « Des cannibales » contains the well-known passage that Shakespeare incorporated into 
The Tempest via Florio’s translation of The Essays. The present paper will examine the relationship of this 
passage, in each of the two writers, to the notion of princely justice with which essay I, xxxi ends and with which 
the play almost ends. In both cases, questions of princely justice are framed in a setting that is geographically 
and ideologically distanced. Both writers ask, explicitly and implicitly, what kinds of justice are possible, whether 
justice is only possible in such settings, and whether justice is itself just a fantasy, given the injustice which 
Montaigne describes in his essay. Part of the discussion will examine the views of modern-day critics, 
especially David Quint, Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy and Michel de Certeau. 
Un fantasme de justice L’essai « Des Cannibales » contient le passage bien connu que Shakespeare 
incorpora à La Tempête à partir de la traduction de Florio. Il s’agira ici d’examiner le lien entre ce passage chez 
chacun des deux écrivains et la notion de justice du prince posée à la fin de l’essai xxxi du livre I et qui clôt 
presque la pièce. Dans les deux cas, la question est posée dans un contexte géographique et idéologique 
permettant une distanciation. Les deux écrivains s’interrogent, explicitement et implicitement, sur les formes 
possibles de la justice, et se demandent si la justice est seulement possible dans les contextes envisagés et si 
la justice elle-même est un fantasme, au vu de l’injustice dont Montaigne dessine les traits dans son essai. 
Pour partie, nous examinerons le point de vue des critiques actuels, notamment ceux de David Quint dans 
« Montaigne et la nature de la miséricorde » et de Michel de Certeau. 
n 1550-51, two men engaged in a dispute. The dispute took place 
in Valladolid and its subject was the native people of the 
Americas. For one of the disputants, the native peoples were 
barely human; they were lascivious and idolatrous, and indulged in 
unnatural practices such as cannibalism and human sacrifice. There 
was consequently no imperative for the Spanish settlers or the Spanish 
authorities in general to accord the natives the usual rights that were 
normal between human beings; for the native peoples were not human; 
they were little better than animals. The second disputant vigorously 
opposed this view. He argued that the native peoples had rational souls 
like the settlers that colonised their land and that consequently they 
were every bit as human as the colonisers and must be treated as their 
ethical equals. The Spaniards had, indeed, a moral obligation towards 
the natives and must discharge this obligation before they incurred the 
wrath of God.  
The two disputants were Sepúlveda and Las Casas respectively. 
Anthony Pagden, who has carried out extensive recent research into 
the context and background of this dispute, and the personalities 
I 
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involved in it, fills in much of the detail.350  The two men probably 
never actually met, he claims, and their dispute was held over a 
prolonged period with statements and counter-statements from each 
side adjudicated by a panel of judges. Las Casas spoke for five days, 
refuting passionately not only all that Sepúlveda had written, but also 
everything that had ever been written against the native Americans. 
Sepúlveda replied with twelve objections; Las Casas countered with 
twelve refutations. It was only when the president of the panel, Soto, 
intervened that the debate drew to an inconclusive close.  
Despite the lack of formal pronouncement in his favour, Las 
Casas emerged as the moral victor. His brief account of the destruction 
of the Indies became a bestseller and he included in it a record of his 
debate with Sepúlveda. A French translation of this work was made by 
J acques de Miggrode and published in Antwerp in 1579 at the behest of 
the Dutch States General who commissioned the work as a warning 
against Spanish imperialism.351 Las Casas’s work, and his committed 
defence of the native inhabitants of the Americas, raised persistent and 
thorny problems, of justice particularly: should natives be treated 
equitably, and if so, how? What rights could they be said to have? And 
a related issue, not directly raised or contested by Las Casas: in what 
sense, if any, could European monarchs claim jurisdiction over the 
New World? What was the basis of their authority apart from the brute 
exercise of power? 
The resonances of this heated debate reverberate elsewhere in 
the literature of the period that touches on the question of the New 
World. The Tem pest is no exception to this rule. In particular, the close 
of the play throws up issues of special interest that claim our attention, 
                                                 
350
 Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Em pires: Europeans and the Rest of the W orld, from  
Antiquity  to the Present , London, Phoenix Press, 2001, p. 77-79, to which my discussion 
here is indebted. The first chapter of Pagden’s earlier work, Spanish Im perialism  and the 
Political Im agination , New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990, “Dispossessing 
the Barbarian: Rights and Property in Spanish America”, p. 13-36 (p. 32-33 for Las Casas), 
elucidates the larger context of Las Casas’s work, detailing the debates that raged over this 
issue of sovereignty, natural rights and the nature of the New World inhabitants in the 
years before and after the contest between Las Casas and Sepúlveda. Pagden’s European 
Encounters w ith the New  W orld, from  Renaissance to Rom anticism , New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press, 1993, chapter 2, “The Autoptic Imagination”, p. 51-87, gives 
extensive coverage to Las Casas as an instance of the eyewitness account. 
351
 Tyrannie et cruautez des Espagnols perpetrees es Indes Occidentales, qu’on dit Le 
Nouueau m onde, Brieuem ent descrites en langue Castellane, par l’Evesque Don Frere 
BARTHELEMY DE LAS CASAS …, fidelem ent traduictes par IAQUES de MIGGRODE, 
Antwerp, Ravelenghien, 1579. 
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notably in relation to questions of distributive and commutative 
justice.352 The mood is one of reconciliation and Prospero is prompted 
to it by Ariel: 
Ariel. Your charm so strongly works ’em 
That if you now beheld them your affections 
Would become tender. 
Prospero.                               Dost thou think so, spirit?  
Ariel. Mine would, sir, were I human. 
Prospero.                                                    And mine shall. 
Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling 
Of their afflictions, and shall not myself,  
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply 
Passion as they, be kindlier moved than thou art? 
Though with their high wrongs I am struck to th’ quick,  
Yet with my nobler reason ’gainst my fury 
Do I take part. The rarer action is  
In virtue than in vengeance. They being penitent,  
The sole drift of my purpose doth extend  
Not a frown further. Go release them, Ariel. 
My charms I’ll break, their senses I’ll restore. 
And they shall be themselves. (V.i.17-32)353 
Prospero’s decision is an object lesson in the clemency the 
Prince was expected to display: the justice by which vengeance could 
justifiably be exacted is foregone in  favour of leniency, commuted into 
mercy in view of the courtiers’ penitence. Prospero will abjure “this 
rough magic”, his “so potent art” (V.i.50). It is a sign that the end of the 
play approaches and with it the resolution of the drama. Yet resolution 
will not be reached, forgiveness not bestowed, without a reminder of 
the wrongs committed. To Alonso, Prospero says: “Most cruelly/ Didst 
thou, Alonso, use me and my daughter./ Thy brother was a furtherer in 
the act. –  / Thou art pinched for ’t now, Sebastian” (V.i.71-74), while his 
words to Antonio highlight the tensions that led to the raising of the 
tempest in the first place: 
                                                 
352
 For the definition of justice in the Renaissance and its background in classical and 
humanist thought, see Ullrich Langer, Vertu du discours, discours de la vertu: Littérature 
et philosophie m orale au XVIe siècle en France, Geneva, Droz, 1999, p. 123-29, and p. 127-
29 for the division of particular justice into distributive and commutative and their 
distinction. 
353
 All references incorporated in the text are to The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen 
Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, J ean E. Howard and Katharine Eisamen Maus, New York and 
London, Norton, 1997. Quotation is by act, scene and line(s).  
248 J OHN O’BRIEN   
 
                                                 Flesh and blood, 
You, brother mine, that entertained ambition, 
Expelled remorse and nature, whom, with Sebastian –   
Whose inward pinches therefore are most strong –   
Would have killed your king, I do forgive thee, 
Unnatural though thou art. (V.i.74-78)  
Alonso echoes these ideas: 
                                 Thy pulse 
Beats as of flesh and blood; […] 
Thy dukedom I resign, and do entreat 
Thou pardon me my wrongs.  (V.i.115-16, 120-21) 
Prospero then addresses Antonio: 
For you, most wicked sir, whom to call brother 
Would even infect my mouth, I do forgive 
Thy rankest fault, all of them, and require 
My dukedom of thee, which perforce I know 
Thou must restore. (V.i.132-36) 
After the distributive justice comes the commutative: Prospero, a little 
later, goes on to say to Alonso:  
My dukedom since you have given me again, 
I will requite you with as good a thing.  (V.i.170-71) 
And shortly afterwards we learn through Gonzalo what this 
commutation is to be: 
Was Milan thrust from Milan, that his issue 
Should become kings of Naples? 
                                  … in one voyage 
Did Claribel her husband find in Tunis,  
And Ferdinand her brother found a wife 
Where he himself was lost; Prospero his dukedom 
In a poor isle; and all of us ourselves,  
When no man was his own.  (V.i.208-10 , 211-16) 
The restoration of order depends on equity, the symmetrical alignment 
of distributive and commutative justice; and we might note that 
Gonzalo’s speech just quoted contains both. The restoration depends 
further on the recognition and acceptance of political and social place, 
as well as being once more in one’s right mind (one’s psychological 
place); each element reasserts in the process the power and authority 
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of the magus and provides definitive proof of his ability to bring his 
magic to successful fruition. 
There is, we know, a notable exception to this rule of perfect 
adequation in the economy of justice. That exception –  deferred until 
after the scene of formal reconciliation, but before Prospero’s address 
to the audience –  is Caliban. To all intents and purposes, a similar 
discursive pattern is followed: Caliban’s conspiracy had been 
discovered by Ariel and Prospero underscores the crime:  
These three354 have robbed me, and this demi-devil,  
For he’s a bastard one, had plotted with them 
To take my life.  (V.i.275-77) 
Despite the gravity of the crime –  a crime even more serious than that 
of Prospero’s brother, Antonio –  Caliban and his fellow conspirators 
are offered clemency. Prospero addresses Caliban: 
                                     Go, sirrah, to my cell. 
Take with you your companions. As you look 
To have my pardon, trim it handsomely.  (V.i.295-97) 
And Caliban’s reply is seeming acquiescence, an indication that he has 
come to his senses and returned to his proper social place of 
subservience: 
Ay, that I will; and I’ll be wise hereafter,  
And seek for grace.  (V.i.298-99) 
Distributive justice, then, in the case of Caliban. But where is 
the commutative justice? It might be argued that in declining to exact 
vengeance on Caliban, Prospero effectively renounces commutative 
justice –  since vengeance, “an eye for an eye”, was an acknowledged 
form of commutative justice.355 Yet the issue goes deeper. If Caliban 
has been a conspirator against Prospero’s life, it is because Prospero 
has been a usurper of Caliban’s isle: as the creature says at the 
beginning of the play, “this island’s mine, by Sycorax my 
mother,/ which thou tak’st from me” (I.ii.334-35). Greenblatt draws the 
appropriate inference: “…across the vast gulf that divides the 
triumphant prince and the defeated savage, there is a momentary, 
                                                 
354
 Meaning Caliban, Stefano and Trinculo. 
355
 Cf. Langer, Vertu du discours, p. 128-29. 
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enigmatic glimpse of a hidden bond: ‘this thing of darkness’, Prospero 
says of Caliban, ‘I/ Acknowledge mine’ (V.i.278-9). The words need only 
be a claim of ownership, but they seem to hint at a deeper, more 
disturbing link between father and monster, legitimate ruler and 
savage, judge and criminal”.356  
Even before Greenblatt had written those words, critics had not 
been slow to understand the implications of this situation for 
colonialism and colonialist discourse. The seminal articles by Francis 
Barker and Peter Hulme, and by Paul Brown, have offered penetrating 
assessments of The Tem pest in terms which illuminate its relationship 
to modern day colonialist and political theory as well as to Elizabethan 
and J acobean conceptualisations of the same.357 The postcolonialist 
line that these articles adopt has, however, met with strong challenge in 
recent years. Deborah Willis specifically takes issue with Brown’s 
article in particular, arguing that the play “is more significantly 
engaged in arousing desire for, and displaying the power of, a ruler at 
the core who can contain a tendency toward oligarchy and division”358, 
and that it is Antonio who represents the real threat since his “evil is 
conceived as an innate quality” and “cannot be banished decisively by 
retributive justice”.359 Other critics offset the postcolonialist argument 
by an emphasis on “the play’s engagement with its own historical 
moment” and thus the dimension of early seventeenth-century 
European politics they see the play as embodying.360  It is with this 
debate in mind that we can situate The Tem pest in respect of its 
dispensation of justice. Prospero stands right with Sepúlveda in 
believing implicitly that native peoples have no claims of legitimacy to 
their own lands compared with the more substantive claim of 
                                                 
356
 The Norton Shakespeare, p. 3053. 
357
 Francis Barker and Peter Hulme, “Nymphs and Reapers Heavily Vanish: The Discursive 
Con-Texts of The Tem pest”, in Alternative Shakepeares, ed. J ohn Drakakis, “New Accents”, 
London and New York, Methuen, 1985, p. 191-205; Paul Brown, “‘This Thing of Darkness I 
Acknowledge Mine’: The Tem pest and the Discourse of Colonialism” in Political 
Shakespeare: New  Essays in Cultural Materialism , ed. J onathan Dollimore and Alan 
Sinfield, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985, p. 48-71. 
358
 Deborah Willis, “Shakespeare’s Tem pest and the Discourse of Colonialism” in W illiam  
Shakespeare: ‘The Tem pest’, A Case Study  in Critical Controversy , ed. Gerald Graff and 
J ames Phelan, Boston and New York, Bedford/ St Martin’s, 2000, p. 256-68; p. 261. Willis’s 
article originally appeared in Studies in English Literature 1500-1900  29/ 2 (1989). 
359
 Willis, “Shakespeare’s Tem pest”, p. 264. 
360
 So David Scott Kastan, “‘The Duke of Milan/ And his Brave Son’: Old Histories and New 
in The Tem pest”, in Graff and Phelan, p. 269-86; p. 275. 
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European monarchy backed by the exercise of God-given power. By 
contrast, it is Caliban himself who articulates his own right to the 
island, not through canon law as Las Casas was to attempt to do on the 
natives’ behalf, but through inheritance from his mother; against the 
distributive justice by which Prospero gives the island to himself, 
Caliban sets natural justice which he sees Prospero as flouting. And as 
Meredith Anne Skura justifiably points out, the play allows Caliban the 
extensive airing of his views and of the injustices he suffers:  
Shakespeare was the first to show one of us mistreating a native, the 
first to represent a native from the inside, the first to allow a native to 
complain  on stage, and the first to make that New World encounter 
problematic enough to generate the current attention to the play.361  
It can be argued, of course, that some sort of justice, of a rough and 
ready kind, is enacted in respect of Caliban, inasmuch as Prospero 
“magnanimously” forbears to punish him for his conspiracy and 
Caliban presumably does get the island back when all have departed. 
However, this latter development is an involuntary concomitant of the 
teleology of justice (and of the drama), not an essential component of 
it; and he consequently receives nothing in exchange for the wrongs he 
has suffered because it is not admitted that he has suffered any wrongs. 
The conclusion of the drama leaves this particular ethical issue 
inconclusive. 
The problem is compounded by a further dimension which 
Greenblatt describes as “two different accounts of the nature of 
mimetic economy”, constituting “a model of unresolved and 
unresolvable doubleness”: 
the island in The Tem pest seems to be an image of the place of pure 
fantasy, set apart from surrounding discourses; and it seems to be an 
image of the place of power, the place in which all individual discourses 
are organized by the half-invisible ruler. […]. The aesthetic space […] is 
constituted by the simultaneous appropriation of and swerving from the 
discourse of power.362 
That doubleness is likewise written into the justice that power 
dispenses. On the one hand, justice can be enacted in such a way as to 
                                                 
361
 Meredith Anne Skura, “Discourse and the Individual: The Case of Colonialism in The 
Tem pest”, Shakespeare Quarterly  40  (1989), p. 42-69; p. 60 . 
362
 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy  in 
Renaissance England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001, p. 158-59. 
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bring about reconciliation between opposing political interests and the 
preservation of dynastic order before power itself is voluntarily laid 
down by Prospero. On the other hand, justice is enacted by exclusion 
from the commutative system of a creature who has rights under 
natural law and whose lèse-m ajesté is forgiven only on condition that 
he accepts subservience in a hierarchy that is alien to him. These 
doublenesses, as Greenblatt also sees, derive from, or at the very least 
are intimately connected to, the status of art, in particular the status of 
Prospero’s art in The Tem pest. The manifestations of the magus’s 
power are manifestations of high art: the ability to conjure the storm in 
the first place, the activity of Ariel who symbolises Prospero’s “word in 
action, the precise, fluent fulfilment of his desires”,363 the deft 
dovetailing of Prospero’s plotting of events and circumstances with the 
larger structural dynamic of the play itself –  all these bear witness to 
the magician’s artifice and the effortless ease with which he organises 
the m ise en scène of incident and character in a play that is self-
consciously, self-advertisingly proud of its alluring fictionality. By the 
same token, justice can be indexed as a positive product of this 
imaginative world which invests fantasy with a value as a philosophical 
and indeed in this case political ideal, able to bring about the 
harmonisations on which the play’s dénouem ent depends. At the same 
time, however, what Prospero restores is an order of culture, owing to 
the supernatural control he wields. The fantasy of justice he creates is 
itself not a natural product, but an ideological one, premised on the 
assumption that art and nature can coincide. The self-reflexive nature 
of the play highlights just how precarious that ideological construct is: 
it is a dream that rounds off a sleep, an insubstantial pageant on a 
shadow stage. 
Let me summarise the argument to this point. The fantasy of 
justice in The Tem pest is a political and social aspiration, best enacted 
–  because most visibly, most potently enacted –  in a place set apart 
from any one particular social order and yet subtending them all; the 
fantasy of justice is just that –  a fantasy, a delusion, only to be enacted 
in a place set apart because pragmatically incompatible with any 
actually-instantiated political or social order: between these two poles 
                                                 
363
 Terry Eagleton, W illiam  Shakespeare, “Re-Reading Literature”, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1986, p. 94. 
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lies the complex dialectic that Shakespeare’s play figures forth as a 
problem allowing of no simple solution. 
It is not, of course, the only point at which tensions and 
disturbances come to the surface in this play. Gonzalo’s speech on the 
commonwealth in Act 2 provides an obvious instance: 
I’ th’ commonwealth I would by contraries 
Execute all things. For no kind of traffic 
Would I admit, no name of magistrate; 
Letters should not be known; riches, poverty, 
And use of service, none; contract, succession, 
Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none; 
No occupation, all men idle; all; 
And women too –  but innocent and pure; 
No sovereignty –   (II.i.147-56) 
And he continues shortly afterwards: 
All things in common nature should produce 
Without sweat or endeavour. Treason, felony, 
Sword, pike, knife, gun, or need of any engine, 
Would I not have; but nature should bring forth 
Of its own kind all foison, all abundance, 
To feed my innocent people.  (II.i.159-64) 
It is a purposely oppositional speech, and at a number of different 
levels. It is, for one thing, not a description that should be regarded as 
co-extensive with the island that the shipwrecked courtiers find on 
their arrival. The island on which they land seems “to be desert” 
(II.i.35) –  both infertile and uninhabited –  whereas Gonzalo calls for a 
place where “nature should bring forth/ Of it own kind all foison, all 
abundance”. Within the space that is demarcated by the staging of the 
drama, a further conceptual space is thus opened up by Gonzalo’s 
musings. If Prospero’s island is at a remove from any contemporary 
reality or setting, then Gonzalo’s commonwealth is at a greater remove 
still. Indeed, Gonzalo’s description of it expressly seeks “T’excel the 
Golden Age” (II.i.168); it is avowedly Utopian, as Frank Lestringant has 
shown in this conference.364 And yet it does, despite that, pass 
comment on issues that prove central to the play. One might note, for 
example, the way sovereignty is discussed in the very presence of 
Alonso and Antonio, a prefigurement of the challenge that Caliban 
                                                 
364
 “Gonzalo’s Books”, and his Le Cannibale. Grandeur et décadence, Paris, Perrin, 1994, 
p. 163-69. 
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constantly presents to the legitimacy of Prospero’s power. More 
insistent is Gonzalo’s emphatic dismissal of the legal system –  “no 
name of magistrate” –  and with it the legislation that covers contract 
and succession: justice will not be maintained by distribution and 
commutation operating under the general name of equity, but 
regulated by Nature, if regulated at all. This is in striking contrast to 
the very dispensation that Prospero himself will enact, and a salutary 
reminder that this dispensation is itself the apogee of a finely tuned art 
that fantasises a solution to the dramatic and political dilemmas, a 
solution that it assumes is acceptable to Nature or is indeed 
indistinguishable from it. 
Gonzalo’s speech does not mention cannibals or Calibans; 
Montaigne’s essay, from one page of which the speech is adapted, 
names the cannibals directly, in its title, and indirectly, through the use 
of the term “sauvage”, which enables the essayist to deploy paradoxes 
and equivocations about who the “sauvages” really are –  they who 
cleave to the state of Nature, or we who have corrupted and abandoned 
it. The paradoxical eulogy that Montaigne sketches near the beginning 
of his essay shares with Gonzalo’s encomium an oppositional stance: in 
the immediate context, it is intended as part of an imaginary debate 
between the essayist and Plato whose conception of the ideal state is, 
for Montaigne, bettered by native society, not least because the 
description of Brazilian life is based on experience. It seeks, therefore, 
not to open up an “ailleurs” that is remoter even than Prospero’s 
island, but rather to import the findings of explorers and adventurers 
into the ambit of Western society and in so doing to dismantle the 
claims of that society to cultural superiority. In particular, of course, 
Montaigne uses the polyvalence of the term “barbarie” in order to 
highlight the barbarity of the French Wars of Religion –  the real 
cannibals are already in France, not outside it. The parallelism in the 
terminology at this point underscores the use of Brazilian culture as a 
form of critique, for the earlier sentence “Les paroles mesmes qui 
signifient le mensonge, la trahison, la dissimulation, l’avarice, l’envie, 
la detraction, le pardon, inouies”365 is partly repeated and echoed in 
the sentence that acts as a commentary on the cannibalism and cruelty 
of the Civil Wars: “… il ne se trouve jamais aucune opinion si desreglée 
                                                 
365
 Les Essais de Michel de Montaigne, édités par Pierre Villey, réédités par V.-L. Saulnier, 
Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1965, p. 206-207. 
  A FANTASY OF J USTICE 255 
qui excusat la trahison, la desloyauté, la tyrannie, la cruauté, qui sont 
nos fautes ordinaires” (I, 31, 210). 
To these well-known strategic features of Montaigne’s use of the 
cannibals can be added a third aspect in which the essayist’s aim is, to 
quote André Tournon, to “précise[r] le partage entre le probable –  
réalité lointaine, perçue à travers des témoignages –  et le contrôlable –  
le sens de ces témoignages, et notre propre attitude envers les 
renseignements qu’ils fournissent”.366 It is this dimension of 
Montaigne’s essay that requires further comment. It may at first sight 
seem strange to evaluate what he says about the cannibals in terms of 
justice (the terms Montaigne explicitly proposes are those of valour), 
especially in “the culture that cannot pardon”, to quote David Quint’s 
description of cannibal society.367 Nonetheless, elements of 
cannibalistic customs recall forms of distribution and commutation, 
but arranged in such a way as to block their easy assessment in 
standard Western terms. Thus in respect of property and inheritance, 
Montaigne notes as follows: 
[Les vieillards] laissent à leurs heritiers en commun cette pleine 
possession de biens par indivis, sans autre titre que celuy tout pur que 
nature donne à ses creatures, les produisant au monde. (I, 31, 210) 
A recognisable system of inheritance is invoked, only to be qualified by 
the remainder of the sentence. Moreover, the cannibals all call each 
other “freres”, erasing or at the very least blurring as a consequence 
distinctions of birth and breeding. A more complex example occurs in 
the case of vengeance which, Montaigne reports, is the object of 
cannibalistic practice. We know from The Tem pest that the regulation 
of vengeance fell squarely into the domain of justice. Yet at just this 
point Montaigne allows the full otherness of cannibal culture to emerge 
from his account. As Michel de Certeau has pointed out, the actual aim 
of cannibal vengeance is to force the captive into an admission of 
weakness; there is, says de Certeau, an economy of speech in which the 
body is the price.368 The ritual of cannibalism prescribes a practice that 
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is almost contractually adhered to by its participants. And what is 
honoured in this contractual ritual is a commutation of bodies: the 
captors are eating not another essentially, but themselves: 
Ces muscles, dit-il, cette cher et ces veines, ce sont les vostres, pauvres 
fols que vous estes; vous ne recognoissez pas que la substance des 
membres de vos ancestres s’y tient encore: savourez les bien, vous y 
trouverez le goust de vostre propre chair. (I, 31, 212) 
The contract is fulfilled when the avenger almost literally devours 
himself. 
Montaigne’s essay shifts, therefore, from ethnographical 
description that brings into play Utopian elements in a standardised 
idealising language–  a feature it shares with Shakespeare –  to the 
reality of the Other in all its strangeness, a strangeness that the essayist 
does nothing to domesticate.369 In the process, characteristics that are 
associated commonly in Western thought with the dispensation of 
justice are systematically skewed and repositioned in a conceptual 
framework that accords them a radically different value.  
This whole process will be accelerated by the final section of the 
essay, where Montaigne turns from the accounts of witnesses to his 
own eye-witness account. At the same time, this closing section 
represents the climax of the momentum by which the reality of the 
cannibals is brought home (in more than one sense) to France. These 
switches in perspective are accompanied by a more overt concentration 
on questions of justice, and nowhere more obviously than in the second 
of the reactions that the cannibals give to life in France: 
ils avoyent aperceu qu’il y avoit parmy nous des hommes pleins et 
gorgez de toutes sortes de commoditez, et que leurs moitiez estoient 
mendians à leurs portes, décharnez de faim et de pauvreté; et trouvoient 
estrange comme ces moitiez icy necessiteuses pouvoient souffrir une 
telle injustice, qu’ils ne prinsent les autres à la gorge, ou missent le feu à 
leurs maisons. (I, 31, 214) 
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In retrospect the superabundant fertility of the New World that 
Montaigne highlights earlier in “Des Cannibales” is not a neutral 
description of a natural state; rather, it passes judgement on the 
inequalities of the Old World, in the same way that the lack of division 
of New World goods condemns Occidental distributions, however 
secured in the judicial system. The premises of Western equity are 
thereby questioned and their inadequacies revealed, as De Certeau 
understands: “their speech, a critique of the injustice that divides our 
social body, judges us”.370   
The first reaction of the natives is, if anything, more telling still: 
Ils dirent qu’ils trouvoient en premier lieu fort estrange que tant de 
grands hommes, portans barbe, forts et armez, qui estoient autour du 
Roy (il est vray-semblable que ils parloient des Suisses de sa garde), se 
soubsmissent à obeyr à un enfant, et qu’on ne choisissoit plus tost 
quelqu’un d’entr’eux pour commander[.] (I, 31, 213) 
It is hard to read this as anything other than a political comment on the 
current state of the monarchy during the Wars of Religion. It is an 
observation on kingly and paternal authority that has, in fact, not yet 
made it as far as the paternal, but has stopped short at adolescence; the 
boy-king Charles IX is from the Brazilian perspective an “enfant”, 
unworthy of the honourable name of “frere” that the natives use among 
themselves. The point can be extended into the closing account that 
Montaigne gives of his exchange with the Brazilian chieftain and the 
leadership he displays in war, the following he has, the respect he is 
shown in peace time. It would have been difficult for many 
contemporary French readers to claim the same for their own king.  
It is usual to think of this section of “Des Cannibales” as 
providing a relativising standpoint on the issues it contains –  France 
seen through cannibal eyes. And that is true. But the implications of 
Montaigne’s encounter with the cannibals, as of Shakespeare’s 
representation of Caliban, go further and deeper. They may perhaps be 
regarded as exemplifications of what de Certeau termed a 
heterology,371 a description of cultural practices and historical 
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specificities proper to the Other that resist Western codifications and 
that create in Western texts disturbances, upheavals, anomalies. No-
one remains unchanged by his encounter with the Other, says de 
Certeau.372 Whether Calibans or cannibals, the extent of their writing 
back is written into the texts of Shakespeare and Montaigne, 
highlighting –  first –  that Occidental justice is a fantasy based on class 
differences that accentuate disparities and inequalities; disputing –  
secondly –  the “natural” right that European princes claim over foreign 
soil; contesting –  thirdly –  the very control they purport to exercise 
over their own subjects since political violence lies restlessly under the 
surface of apparent social order. 
Montaigne gives us one more vision of the cannibals in his 
Essais, this time in the “Apologie de Raymond Sebond”: 
Ce qu’on nous dict de ceux du Bresil, qu’ils ne mouroyent que de 
vieillesse, et qu’on attribue à la serenité et tranquillité de leur air, je 
l’attribue plustost à la tranquillité et serenité de leur ame, deschargée de 
toute passion et pensée et occupation tendue ou desplaisante, comme 
gents qui passoyent leur vie en une admirable simplicité et ignorance, 
sans lettres, sans loy, sans roy, sans relligion quelconque. (II, 12, 491) 
It is a typically provocative comment, placed shortly after Montaigne’s 
no less provocative discussion of Pyrrho’s pig, who represents for him 
Sceptical ataraxia.373 Yet it is also a charming comment, a vignette of 
peace and innocence. In the event, the inhabitants of the New World 
were not long to enjoy such peace of mind. Nor was the King of France. 
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